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Abstract: 
A well-known critique in the research literature of critical mathematics education 
suggests that framing educational questions in cultural terms can encourage ethnic-
cultural essentialism, obscure conflicts within cultures and promote an ethnographic 
or anthropological stance towards learners.  
Nevertheless, we believe that some of the obstacles to learning mathematics are 
cultural. ‘Stereotype threat’, for example, has a basis in culture. Consequently, the 
aims of critical mathematics education cannot be seriously pursued without including 
a cultural approach in educational research.  
We argue that an adequate conception of culture is available and should include 
normative/descriptive and material/ideal dyads as dialectical moments.  
Ethnomathematics and its discontents 
The concept of culture is rarely invoked explicitly in the research literature on critical mathematics 
education. The reason for this is not hard to find. Ole Skovsmose, the founding father of critical 
mathematics education, was deeply affected by the apartheid system in South Africa (Skovsmose 
first arrived in South Africa in 1993 and later started to collaborate with the South African 
researcher Renuka Vithal). Consequently, he is very careful in his use of the notion of culture.  A 
so-called ‘appreciation’ of pupils’ cultural background (such as Zulu culture) could be associated 
with people “out there” and “down there” (Skovsmose 2014: 64).  Cultural approaches run the risk 
of essentialism and worse.  For Skovsmose, the fact that pupils have cultural backgrounds is not a 
“simple truth” (Skovsmose 2014: 64).  
Meanwhile, in the literature on mathematics education, ‘culture’ has become associated with the 
ethnomathematics movement, because the ethnoi of ethnomathematics are “identifiable cultural 
groups”.1 Thus, ‘culture’ (at least when used as a count-noun) is part of the founding definition of 
ethnomathematics. This movement was the object of a withering critique from the critical 
mathematics education research group by Skovsmose and Vithal (1997). The principal point of this 
critique was that the ethnomathematical approach is uncritical with respect to the cultures that 
pupils belong to, the discourses around culture in general and the role of mathematics in 
formatting the world as we experience it.  Regarding the cultural backgrounds of pupils, 
Skovsmose and Vithal argue that these might not be entirely benign or free from internal conflict. 
Indeed, it would be a very unusual human culture that had no internal conflicts, egregious power 
1 D’Ambrosio (1985) p. 45. 
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relations or structural injustices. Turning to the broader discourse, talk about ‘culture’ can easily 
fall into a reductive ethnic essentialism and even outright racism. They make this point 
dramatically by shifting the context of the discussion from Brazil (where ethnomathematics 
emerged) to South Africa. They argue that, in that context, the proposal that pupils from different 
ethno-cultural backgrounds should have different kinds of mathematical education to reflect their 
cultural differences sounds rather like the rationale that used to be given for the educational 
arrangements under apartheid.  
Skovsmose and Vithal do not suggest that the ethnomathematics movement is somehow guilty of 
implicit racism or secretly supportive of apartheid. On the contrary, they affirm that they share the 
progressive goals of the ethnomathematics movement. Rather, their point is that the 
ethnomathematics research programme lacks the theoretical resources to distance itself from 
apartheid education. In his programmatic works on ethnomathematics, D’Ambrosio took a broad 
view of his core notion, thus, “we will call ethnomathematics the mathematics which is practised 
among identifiable cultural groups, such as national-tribal societies, labor groups, children of a 
certain age bracket, professional classes, and so on.” (1985:45). The ethnoi of his 
ethnomathematics are not solely racial or national-tribal groups. But they do include national-
tribal groups, and this makes it difficult to explain in technical, scientific, value-neutral terms why 
the proponents of apartheid education should not be part of the ethnomathematics movement. 
The reason they cannot join is that the apartheid regime and the ethnomathematics movement 
have quite different political goals, but this reference to political goals cannot be part of the 
technical core of a scientific research programme. 
In general, the ethnoi of D’Ambrosio’s ethnomathematics are groups to which learners are 
assumed to belong simply and unproblematically. Part of Skovsmose and Vithal’s argument is that 
membership of such groups is often involuntary and may be established, achieved or imposed 
through the exercise of power-relations. Discovering mathematics in the practices of a group to 
which one is proud and glad to belong is one thing. It is another to have one’s mathematics 
education tangled up with a group-membership that is uneasy or coerced, or which one is 
unwilling to discuss in class. Above all, ethnomathematics addresses the learner as a member of a 
cultural group, rather than as an individual. Of course, it does not follow that teachers who bring 
an ethnomathematical approach into their pedagogy must be guilty of treating their pupils as 
instances of types. This is unlikely to happen. The point rather is that ethnomathematics as 
pedagogical theory has no resources to explain why they should not treat pupils solely as instances 
of their ethnic types. For example, Presmeg (1998), working in the USA, identifies four principles 
for introducing ethno-cultural material into school mathematics classes. The first two are:  
1. Each student is considered as having a unique sociocultural history; each student has 
ethnicity. 
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2. This ethnicity is a mathematical resource; mathematics may be developed from associated 
cultural practices.2 
The first principle is a clear expression of the conflict between treating learners as individuals and 
treating them as members of cultural groups. Each student does indeed have a unique 
sociocultural history—that is part of what makes each student a unique individual, not reducible 
to membership of any group. It is also the case that each student has ethnicity, that is, belongs to 
some cultural group(s). But the second of these truths cannot possibly be an explication of the 
first. This is because membership of such groups is not a simple, unproblematic relation that we 
might symbolise thus: . Rather, belonging to a group is a task—one has to work out what it 
means for oneself to be female, or Irish, or heterosexual, or black, or the child of immigrants or 
market traders, or whatever it might be. Each person might carry out these tasks differently. Each 
of us might come to a different accommodation with membership of whichever groups we happen 
to find ourselves in. In other words, it’s not quite right to say that “each student has ethnicity”, as 
each student has a blood group and a shoe size.  Rather, each student constructs (or struggles 
with) his or her ethnicities.   Ethnicity is not a fixed property but a dynamic process of giving 
meaning to the different constituents of identity.  This too is part of our individuality.  
This is not Presmeg’s confusion alone—it arises from the combination of an ethnomathematical 
approach and a proper concern for individual difference. The second principle states starkly that 
the learners’ ethnicities are a resource for the teacher (who may belong to some other ethnicity 
altogether) to use in the teaching of the school curriculum. Learners are likely to notice when their 
cultures are being instrumentalised. They may resent it, and they could not be blamed if they did. 
Here again, we cite Presmeg only because she expresses the logic of ethnomathematical pedagogy 
with unusual clarity, and thereby displays its aporia.  
Ethnomathematics suffers from some other logical tensions that will have a bearing on the 
present argument. It pretends to treat all mathematical practices equally, but it a) seeks to 
valorise some practices and denigrate some forms of education and b) imposes the concept of 
mathematics on practices found in cultures where this concept is not present—specifically, a 
concept of mathematics that is abstract and modern (dating from the early twentieth century). 
Until relatively recently, European mathematicians understood mathematics to be the science of 
number, magnitude and geometrical space. This was Kant’s (1724-1804) view; his philosophical 
account of mathematical knowledge founded it on arithmetic and geometry (each in turn 
grounded in a suitable pure intuition).3 When his near contemporary Euler (1707-1783) received 
the Königsberg bridges problem, he wrote in reply, “…this type of solution bears little relationship 
to mathematics, and I do not understand why you expect a mathematician to produce it, rather 
than anyone else, for the solution is based on reason alone, and its discovery does not depend on 
                                                          
2 Presmeg (1998) p. 321 
3 Critique of Pure Reason. The details do not matter for the present purpose—all we need is that for Kant, if you have 
arithmetic and geometry, you have mathematics.  
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any mathematical principle.”4 We now recognise the Königsberg bridges problem as belonging to 
mathematics, specifically, to graph theory. In order to see the mathematics in basket-weaving, 
string forms, kolam-drawing and city tour-route design, it is necessary to move beyond the 
antique conceptions of Euler and Kant, and to deploy an up-to-date notion of mathematics such as 
“the science of patterns” or “the science of detachable relational insights”5. Such broad definitions 
reflect the rise in the twentieth century of mathematics concerned with such abstracta as sets, 
graphs, topologies, morphisms and categories. (For the argument that twentieth-century 
academic mathematics marks a deep shift from its precursors, see Lautman 2006 or Gray 2008.) In 
other words, ethnomathematics breaks the first rule of anthropology in spectacular fashion. It 
analyses ‘ethnic’ practices using a concept imposed from without, a concept, moreover, which is 
only intelligible to the relatively small number of people with a university-level education in 
contemporary pure mathematics.  
Aside from this spectacular violation of anthropological method, the appeal to this modern, 
abstract notion of mathematics presents a practical pedagogical difficulty. One way of using 
ethnomathematics in the classroom is to offer pupils activities that can function as a bridge from 
the mathematical practices they already engage in to the school mathematics curriculum and 
thence to practical mathematics for their future lives. This may be plausible if the pupils’ 
mathematical practices are relatively close to the curriculum—for example, if they are already 
using money or weights and measures. However, ethnomathematics tends to elide mathematical 
practices with practices susceptible of mathematical analysis. As Presmeg reports, “Millroy’s… 
carpenters, Saxe’s… candy sellers, Lave’s… grocery shoppers – none of these considered 
themselves to be engaged in doing mathematics.” (Presmeg 1998:328). She goes on to make the 
point vivid with a study that finds a dihedral group of order eight in the Warlpiri kinship system. 
We might persuade people that measuring and counting wood, candy, groceries and money are 
examples of the same activity as school mathematics. We are unlikely to persuade the Warlpiri 
that in forming marriages, they’re doing algebra. Similarly, there is in print a mathematical analysis 
of tying a neck-tie (which activity is, from a mathematical point of view, equivalent to a short walk 
on a triangular lattice).6 No-one supposes that tying a neck-tie is a mathematical practice, even 
though it consists of iterations of elementary operations. Certainly, the authors did not take 
themselves to be writing ethnomathematics. Activities such as tie-tying and basket-weaving only 
count as mathematics because modern mathematicians can recognise abstract structures in them, 
but this is unlikely to help learners. If the path from ethnomathematical practices to book-keeping, 
engineering and statistical analysis has to go through group theory or graph theory, it is unlikely to 
                                                          
4 Leonhard Euler, letter of April 1736, quoted in Hopkins & Wilson (2004) p. 201. He went on to complicate this point 
by wondering whether the bridge-problem might be the sort of thing that Leibniz had gestured at with his talk of 
‘geometry of position’. Nevertheless, the example stands up well enough for the present purpose.  
5 Thomas (1996) and Steen (1990) respectively, both quoted in Presmeg (1998) p. 328. 
6 Fink & Mao (2001) 
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offer much improvement on existing routes. Pupils might do better starting school mathematics 
from a blank slate after all. 
In their analysis, Vithal & Skovsmose (1997) drew on some of Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas on the 
reproduction of the social structure and the mediating role of the school. They argue that 
identifications of students aligned with cultural categories (class, race, gender, …) establish 
expectations regarding their academic success. These expectations may suppress or repress the 
student’s academic performances, both predicted and recorded (since the former influences the 
latter). This role of the school system in reproducing social structure is rarely discussed (Bourdieu 
1996). Vithal & Skovsmose (1997) introduce their notion of foreground, which they understand as 
‘the set of opportunities that the learner’s social context makes accessible to the learner to 
perceive as his or her possibilities for the future’ (Vithal & Skovsmose 1997: 147). Skovsmose 
emphasises the political and cultural situation as an important aspect of the foreground since they 
condition the opportunities for the learner (Skovsmose, 2005). The notion of foreground also 
makes the political nature of the learning process explicit. From this context we can understand 
that Skovsmose gives more attention to the notions of politics and sociology—rather than the 
concept of culture—to analyse educational processes in contemporary societies (Alrø, Ravn & 
Valero 2010). 
Skovsmose’s work deeply influenced research in critical mathematics education and increased the 
focus on the micro-level of mathematics education. The notion of culture within the research 
community of critical mathematics education almost disappeared, as may be seen in the 
festschrift for Ole Skovsmose (Alrø et al. 2010). The preface indicates that Skovsmose’s work 
mostly contributed to mathematics (education) in relation “to society, educational thinking that 
emphasises the politics and sociology of educational processes in mathematics, and pedagogical 
thinking that connects the philosophical and educational reflections with issues of relevance for 
the micro-processes of teaching and learning of mathematics” (Alrø et al. 2010: vii). 
Note that Skovsmose and Vithal direct their critique principally at ethnomathematics as a 
pedagogical proposal (p. 135). They do not oppose the project of investigating ethnic practices 
that fall under the broadest possible conception of mathematics, broadening the history of 
mathematics or examining mathematics in non-academic contexts. The debate has evolved since 
1997—see Pais (2010) for a summary of developments after Skovsmose and Vithal’s critique, 
Skovsmose (2011:84-87 and 2015) for a recent statement of his reservations about 
ethnomathematics as pedagogy, and Knijnik (2012) for an attempt to make good the shortcomings 
of ethnomathematical theory. None of the points in this section is original—they all occur in the 
cited literature. The purpose of this first section is just to explain why people in the critical 
mathematics education research group rarely deploy ‘culture’ as a technical term, even if they 
sometimes use the word. 
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Culture, again 
One of the claims of this paper is that the concept of culture is important for understanding 
mathematical practices and mathematics education. Having sketched some of the problems 
arising from the word’s association with ethnomathematics, we are in a position to ask whether it 
is possible to recover a concept of culture that can escape these difficulties. To that end, this 
section will develop a reflection on the notion of culture in general. It draws on arguments 
elaborated in Larvor (2016a). 
The word ‘culture’ is semantically rich. Its many meanings divide into two broad groups: 
normative/educative and descriptive/scientific. On one side, there are the normative senses in 
which culture is a good thing, valuable in its own right and for the people who have it, both 
individually and collectively. Thus, a person may be cultured. Such use of the term ‘culture’ 
requires a high level of confidence in the associated evaluations. One must firmly believe that one 
knows what is valuable in order to deploy the word in this way, and be confident of culture’s good 
effects. Culture, thus understood, stands in contrast to nature and ennobles the youth fortunate 
to be educated in it. Culture in this sense need not be ‘high culture’, that is, great works of high 
art, but it does require distinctions of quality and some sense of sustained tradition. Even the most 
recently emerged genres of art and music have agreed masterpieces and landmarks. Any aspiring 
rappers now must know their Public Enemy from their Run DMC. Mathematics can constitute 
culture in this sense—one reason for keeping it in the curriculum is that it is part of the common 
cultural treasury of humanity. Paul Ernest, speaking at a conference in London on mathematical 
cultures, spoke of introducing learners to the ‘poetry of mathematics’.7 We may wonder—without 
cynicism—whether it would be possible to justify the teaching of mathematics on the same 
grounds as the teaching of poetry.8 Notice that in this paragraph, ‘culture’ functions as a mass-
noun. 
This family of normative/educative senses of ‘culture’ forms a dyad with the family of 
descriptive/scientific senses. We say ‘dyad’ because every distinction establishes a relation, and 
traces of the normative/educative sense are detectable throughout the descriptive and scientific 
literature on culture in general and mathematical cultures in particular. In any case, we should 
expect to see a normativity implicit in any research directed at the question ‘How can we teach 
mathematic better’, even if that research makes explicit use of descriptive or scientific concepts of 
culture. Indeed, Skovsmose (without mentioning culture) explicitly refers to this interplay between 
the normative and descriptive aspects of critical mathematics education.9 We therefore think that 
                                                          
7 https://sites.google.com/site/mathematicalcultures/  
8 There is, for example, more than a trace of Matthew Arnold in Paul Lockhart’s (2009). Ernest (2000) makes a 
distinction between capability and appreciation that emphasises the value of mathematics as cultural achievement.  
9 See the interview in Alrø, Ravn and Valero (2010) pp. 1-9, in which he relates his thinking to philosophers associated 
with critical theory such as Habermas, Adorno and Foucault. Especially: “A critical activity cannot only represent 
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the normative/educative and the descriptive/scientific senses of ‘culture’ stand in dialectical 
relation rather than absolute separation.  
On the descriptive, scientific or anthropological senses of the term ‘culture’, a good place to start 
is the magisterial literature review in Kroeber, A.L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952) Culture: A critical 
review of concepts and definitions. This report starts with the first recorded scholarly uses of the 
term and tracks its evolution and differentiation up to their time of writing. This is of some 
interest, given the discussion so far, because Kroeber and Kluckhohn explore both sides of the 
descriptive/normative distinction, and their historical survey includes those German thinkers of 
the nineteenth century who saw this distinction as the ground of a relation. 
At the end of their historical journey, Kroeber and Kluckhohn land on this definition of culture, 
which they take to be an approximation of the view of “most social scientists”: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, 
including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional 
(i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture 
systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as 
conditioning elements of further action.10  
In this definition, we see a tension that turns up more widely in the descriptive senses of culture. 
The first part of this definition presents culture as patterns of behaviour, embodied in and 
transmitted by symbols and artefacts. From a positivist or behaviourist point of view, that sounds 
scientifically respectable. Symbols, artefacts and behaviours are all empirically detectable (setting 
aside the question of how a purely empirical consciousness could recognise them as symbols, 
artefacts and behaviours). However, they go on to say that the core of (a) culture is “ideas and 
especially their attached values”. Ideas and values are not so easy to detect empirically, except 
perhaps indirectly through their effects. This mention of values is not an afterthought; on the 
contrary, for Kroeber and Kluckhohn, values are central to anthropology: “Values provide the only 
basis for the fully intelligible comprehension of culture, because the actual organisation of all 
cultures is primarily in terms of their values.”11 It is also worth noting their use of the term 
‘achievement’. This is a success-word, and therefore invokes a normative sense of culture, though 
presumably the criteria of success are culture-specific.  
Social science has not stood still since 1952, but the core of Kroeber & Kluckhohn’s account is 
recognisable in more recent definitions of culture. Writing in 1989, Banks, Banks, & McGee claim 
that,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
uncertainty. It also represents concerns, and the formulation of concerns immediately brings us to the formulation of 
visions, aspirations, and hopes.” (p. 7).  
10 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952 p. 181 
11 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952 p. 340.  Note that ‘culture’ occurs in this sentence both as a mass-noun and as a count-
noun.   
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Most social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, 
and intangible aspects of human societies. The essence of a culture is not its artifacts, 
tools, or other tangible cultural elements but how the members of the group interpret, 
use, and perceive them. It is the values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that 
distinguish one people from another in modernized societies; it is not material objects and 
other tangible aspects of human societies. People within a culture usually interpret the 
meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the same or in similar ways.12  
We should expect to find this taut duality in any study of culture because the two ends need each 
other. The behaviours and artefacts do not classify themselves or explain themselves; the ideas 
and values must body forth in words, deeds and things if they are to have any presence at all. We 
can find this tension in the philosophy of mathematical practice. Mathematics is obviously 
concerned with ideas, but studying mathematical practices directs attention to artefacts 
(blackboards, notations, diagrams, models and computers) and behaviours (gesticulating, writing, 
sketching, gathering mathematicians in groups of various sizes, etc.).  
Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s emphasis on values as “the only basis for the fully intelligible 
comprehension of culture” conforms to some popular usages, especially when culture is 
contested. ‘Cultural issues’ in politics are precisely those that are not driven primarily by prudence 
or efficiency, and they tend to form blocs—support for rote-learning of times-tables tends (in the 
UK at least) to coincide with social conservatism and a yearning for deference, while enthusiasm 
for whole-book teaching of reading sits with environmentalism and new-age spirituality.  These 
blocs do not make sense in practical terms—there is no logical reason why a person’s view about 
teaching basic literacy or numeracy should predict their foreign policy stances or their openness to 
religious innovation. Rather, these apparently technical judgments (such as, how best to teach 
multiplication or the extent of human influence on the global climate) come to seem expressive of 
some general values and attitudes towards authority, society and the self. That is what 
expressions like ‘culture wars’ seek to capture. Similarly, there is a whole industry dedicated to 
achieving cultural changes in organisations, as managements have come to believe that changing 
policies and practices alone do not achieve their desired ends. In December 2015, there was a 
scandal because the UK Financial Conduct Authority dropped its report into banking culture. The 
suspicion fuelling the sense of scandal was that political pressure was brought to bear precisely 
because a review that addressed the culture of banking might achieve changes that piecemeal 
adjustments to rules and practices cannot. 
This rather abstract discussion then gives us two thoughts:  
                                                          
12 Banks, J.A., Banks, & McGee, C. A. (1989). Note the reference to ‘modernized societies’.  
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1. There is a dialectical relationship between the material aspects of culture (the artefacts 
and practices) and the ideas and values, such that culture is unintelligible without 
reference to values.  
2. There is a relation between descriptive and normative approaches to culture such that the 
normative aspect can never be eliminated. To understand a culture is to understand its 
values, but this always involves some dialogue with the researcher’s own values (even if 
these are solely norms of scientific practice).  
The Interest of Mathematics Education in Culture  
Our emphasis on the centrality of values for the intelligibility of culture has consequences for both 
approaches to mathematics education under discussion here. For ethnomathematics, the ethnoi 
are defined culturally, which on our view means, through their values.  Thus teachers who 
instrumentalise ethnic practices for mathematics teaching bring value-laden practices into the 
classroom without knowing what those values are—nor how they will stand in relation to the 
values of the individual students, the classroom, the school and the curriculum.13  So, our claim 
that cultures must be understood in terms of their values clarifies and deepens the existing 
critique of ethnomathatical pedagogy.  On the other hand, this same claim of ours supports 
D’Ambrosio’s insistence that all groups are socioculturally determined, including Western 
academic mathematicians. Bishop (2008, 2016) identified and analysed values connected to 
Western academic mathematics (see also Ernest 2016).  If Kroeber and Kluckhohn are right that 
the core of a culture is its values, then Bishop’s work shows us the core of the culture of Western 
mathematics.  Our development of the notion of culture articulates more clearly the 
ethnomathematicians’ claim that the Western mathematics curriculum also brings value-laden 
practices into the classroom.  It remains to be seen what effect this might have on the grander 
aspirations of the ethnomathematics movement, which are to build a civilization that rejects the 
colonial politics of imposing one curriculum (the Western one) worldwide (Pinxten & François 
2011). They hope to restore cultural dignity, reinforce cultural self-respect and empower currently 
excluded people and societies (D’Ambrosio 2015).  Nevertheless, articulating these aims in terms 
of values (which can overlap and inform each other) rather than discrete cultures might offer 
more practical possibilities than does the simple narrative of oppression and resistance.   
Our development of the notion of culture may have another consequence for the 
ethnomathematics programme.  Our suggestion that descriptive and normative aspects of culture 
cannot be wholly separated entails that wholly value-neutral anthropology is impossible.  This may 
offer researchers in ethnomathematics a defence against the charge that their work is too 
interested in pedagogy and politics to count as science. If we are right, then all ethnology is an 
                                                          
13 For analyses of national differences in school and classroom cultures, see essays by Andrews and Gosztonyi in Larvor 
(2016b).  
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encounter between value-imbued research practices and value-imbued ‘ethnic’ practices.  Then 
the question is not, how can this encounter be rendered value-free, but rather, how can it be 
negotiated?   
Turning to critical mathematics education, recall Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s claim that culture 
systems are “conditioning elements of further action”. In other words, pupils’ background and 
foreground (in Skovsmose’s sense) are determined in part by culture. Culture tells you what is 
possible and what is worth doing, and it tells you where you fit in.  Skovsmose and Vithal 
developed the notion of foreground precisely to criticize and to overcome the stereotyping effects 
of pupils’ backgrounds. Stereotyping affects the recorded and expected performances of pupils 
and therefore it affects their futures.  The notion of foreground is developed to make learning 
obstacles visible as political issues based on the students’ backgrounds rather than as individual 
phenomena. The notion of foreground frames the teaching and the learning of mathematics 
within a social and political context of ‘social justice education’ in order to overcome cultural 
determination (Burton 2003, François 2016). Although the notion of foreground and the 
programme of social justice are part of culture, critical mathematics researchers emphasise more 
the social and political aspect due to the association of culture with determinism, as we discussed 
in the first section.  We argue that this is a missed opportunity, because an appropriate notion of 
culture can forge analytic connections between ethnomathematics, critical mathematics 
education and work on values in mathematics by Bishop and Ernest.   
One example—omnipresent in the social justice debate—is the gendering of mathematics, 
particularly the widespread conviction that it is not for girls. This shows itself to some degree in 
measurable effects such as stereotype threat.14 This is the reduction in cognitive test performance 
caused by reminding subjects that they are members of groups that are stereotypically less good 
at tasks of the type tested. For example, the reminder might take the form of requiring subjects to 
write their genders on the front of their answer-books. There is a measurable effect in the case of 
mathematics, though this varies with age and with the degree of commitment to mathematics. 
One might think that the solution is to avoid such reminders, both in the testing procedure (use of 
candidate numbers rather than names, for example) and in the test content. However, 
experiments on stereotype threat do not record all the effects of sexist culture. They merely 
record the effect of a reminder of group membership on the day of the test. Girls going in to a 
mathematics exam already know that they are girls, even before they write ‘F’ in a box on the 
front of their answer-book or fill in their gendered names. The experiments on stereotype threat 
do not capture the effects of this prior knowledge on their learning. Nor do they measure the 
effects of gendered stereotypes on girls’ choices—we do not know how many girls choose not to 
study mathematics as a result of their being persuaded that it is not for them. What the 
stereotype threat experiments do suggest is that these effects may be significant. 
                                                          
14 See Doyle & Voyer (2016) 
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In general, sexism, racism, class-prejudice, etc. are cultural (that is, value-laden) structures that 
may find expression in all sorts of practices—this is the material-ideal dyad in action. If we think 
about practices in isolation without considering that they are expressive of and ramifying of 
clusters of values, we won’t get them right or act effectively. Consider how ineffectual appeals to 
reason are in discussions of gun ownership in the US or fox hunting in the UK—precisely because 
such appeals fail to recognise the role of these issues as expressive of values relating to identity 
and belonging. This is not to deny that changing practices can change culture; recall that we 
claimed that the material-ideal dyad must be part of any viable conception of culture. Changing 
rules, policies and practices can make a difference, but the case made here is that real change 
requires us to understand such changes at the material end of the dyad as exemplary and 
expressive of a shift at the ideal end, in the corresponding system of values. 
To conclude: the aims of the critical mathematics education movement require attention to 
culture, but this requires a conception of culture that avoids the shortcomings of 
ethnomathematics, and is especially apt to avoid the risks of stereotyping and essentialism. While 
speaking of ‘culture’, we must recall that pupils belong to multiple cultures: school culture, peer 
culture, home culture, and so on (this may be what Presmeg’s first principle was trying to capture). 
These all interact in unpredictable ways, and pupils all have their own ways of relating to the 
cultural groups that they find themselves in. Recall our observation that ‘culture’ sometimes 
functions as a mass-noun rather than as a count-noun. The cultural life of a pupil may be more like 
the turbulent flow of liquids than a stable relation to a static object. Since culture is an 
unavoidable topic given the aims of the critical mathematics education movement, we need a 
notion of culture that captures this dynamism. We believe that the two-dimensional framework 
offered here (the two dimensions being material/ideal and normative/descriptive) may be a useful 
contribution to this endeavour. 
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